A persistent focus on the concept of emergence as a core element of the scientific method allows a clean separation, insofar as this is possible, of the physical and philosophical aspects of the problem of outcomes in quantum mechanics. The philosophical part of the problem is to explain why a closed system has definite experimental outcomes. The physical part is to show mathematically that there exists a limit in which the contradiction between unitary Schrödinger dynamics and a reduction process leading to distinct outcomes becomes negligible according to an explicitly stated criterion, and to make this criterion as objective as possible. The physical problem is solved here by redefining the notion of a quantum state and finding a suitable measure for the change of state upon reduction. The appropriate definition of the quantum state is not as a ray or density operator in Hilbert space, but rather as an equivalence class consisting of all density operators in a given subspace, the members of which all describe the same experimental outcome. For systems containing only subsystems that are integrated with their environments, these equivalence classes can be represented mathematically by projection operators, and the resulting formalism is closely related to that used by von Neumann to study the increase of entropy predicted by the second law of thermodynamics. However, nearly isolated subsystems are reduced only indirectly, as a consequence of their interaction with integrated subsystems. The reduced states of isolated subsystems are the same conditional states used in the definition of quantum discord. The key concepts of decoherence theory can all be adapted to fit this definition of a quantum state, resulting in a unified theory capable of resolving, in principle, all aspects of the quantum measurement problem. The theory thus obtained is weakly objective but not strongly objective.
I. INTRODUCTION
The measurement problem has been the central mystery of quantum mechanics for more than 90 years [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . It comprises three distinct but interrelated issues [9] . The interference problem is to explain why quantum interference effects are difficult to observe, especially on macroscopic scales. The preferred-basis problem is to define which particular set of variables is actually observed. The problem of outcomes, also called the and-or problem [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , is to reconcile our perception of a unique experimental outcome with the superposition of many outcomes generated by the Schrödinger equation. How is it physically possible to perceive Schrödinger's cat [15] as dead or alive, rather than as a superposition of dead and alive (whatever that might mean)? The ultimate goal is to reconcile the notorious "reduction" or "collapse" of the quantum state with the unitary dynamics of a closed system.
It is well known that this cannot be done in the sense of a strict logical deduction, because the two processes are fundamentally contradictory [1, 2, 5, 16, 17] . The goal is rather to show that reduction emerges from unitary dynamics, in much the same way that temperature in thermodynamics emerges from statistical mechanics. That is, we must show that there exists some limit in which the discrepancy between the two processes vanishes. This technique is ubiquitous in the physical sciences [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] ; from the standard model of quantum field theory [29] on up, there is no example of an empirically validated scientific theory that is not widely accepted to be emergent.
It is now generally acknowledged that, in this sense, the theory of decoherence [9, [30] [31] [32] [33] has solved both the interference problem and the preferred-basis problem [9] . The problem of outcomes, however, remains unsolved [9, 30, 34] . This is a problem in physics, not in philosophy or interpretation.
Faced with an open contradiction at the heart of a fundamental physical theory, the job of the physicist [35] is either to "define the real problem" by showing that the theoretical conflict has definite experimental implications, or to prove "that there's no real problem" by showing that the contradiction can be resolved as a case of emergence. Feeling "nervous" at our sustained inability to finish this job is the mark of a good scientist [35] , not of a bad philosopher or interpreter.
Here I show that the problem of outcomes can indeed be resolved as a case of emergence. A crucial element of the solution is finding a suitable measure for the change in the quantum state upon reduction. The solution is not trivial, because it only works if the quantum state itself is redefined. The quantum state should be defined neither as a ray in Hilbert space nor as a statistical mixture of such rays (i.e., as a density operator), but as an equivalence class [36] [37] [38] of density operators. The properties of a closely related equivalence class were studied long ago by von Neumann [36] , but his results have since been all but forgotten. The central message of this paper is that a modified version of von Neumann's definition allows the last remaining part of the quantum measurement problem to be solved. This modification unifies von Neumann's theory with various elements of modern decoherence theory, including the concept of a conditional state used in the definition of quantum discord [39] [40] [41] [42] . A brief account of the equivalence-class formulation of the quantum state is presented elsewhere [43] , focusing on the central role played by Bohr's concept of complementarity.
It should be stressed that this emergence-based solution does not answer philosophical questions such as why measurements have outcomes at all, or what it is that selects a particular outcome [9] . However, as discussed below, it is doubtful whether pilot-wave [44] [45] [46] or dynamical-reduction [47, 48] theories truly answer these questions either, because their ontological claims are based on concepts that seem to be entirely explicable as emergent.
The paper begins in Sec. II with a discussion of how the concept of emergence allows us to reconcile the often contradictory demands of different levels of physical theory. Section III argues that such contradictions are inherent in the scientific method itself. Section IV reviews the mathematical formalism for the reduction process in conventional quantum mechanics. Section V reviews the use of decoherence theory to justify the emergence of noninterference between conditional probabilities in a quantum history. The significance of various possible metrics for the emergence of outcomes is studied in Sec. VI.
Section VII shows that the problem of outcomes can be resolved in the special case of integrated subsystems by von Neumann's definition of equivalence classes. Comparison between theory and experiment is made possible by the emergence of statistical frequencies in an ensemble, as described in Sec. VIII. The theory is extended to include isolated subsystems in Sec. IX. The preferredbasis problem is addressed in Sec. X using a modified version of Zurek's predictability sieve. Section XI discusses the weakly objective nature of the solutions and examines various claims of strong objectivity in quantum mechanics. Reasons why the concept of emergence is applicable to the quantum measurement problem are further discussed in Sec. XII. Finally, Sec. XIII summarizes the conclusions of the paper.
II. WHAT EMERGENCE MEANS
It is important to clarify at the outset some possible misconceptions [49] that could arise from popular slogans such as "more is different" [18] and from the idea that the elementary entities of an emergent level of description "obey the laws" [18] of the more fundamental level. These might give the impression that the concept of emergence is inapplicable to such fundamentally disparate processes as quantum-state reduction and unitary dynamics. However, this is not so; there is no essential difference between this case of emergence and that of, say, temperature in thermodynamics.
Thermodynamics emerges from statistical mechanics in the so-called thermodynamic limit N → ∞, V → ∞, N/V = constant, in which N is the number of particles in a system and V is its volume. Of course, in any real experiment, N and V are finite, but typically N 1. Invoking the thermodynamic limit is a signal that one intends to ignore small terms involving δ = 1/N in certain parts of the theory, while usually retaining them in other parts of the theory. The validity of the limit simply means that if neglecting these terms gives acceptable results when δ = δ 0 1, then the same will be true for all other cases in which δ < δ 0 ; there is no need to investigate these cases individually.
Ignoring δ in certain parts of a theory means setting δ = 0 when actually δ > 0. This changes the logical structure of the theory, so that many things that were true in the original theory become false in the modified theory, and vice versa. The two theories are thus logically contradictory for all cases of practical relevance (i.e., when δ > 0). Within the modified logical framework, there may be some new concepts that are immensely powerful in elucidating the structure of the new theory (i.e., they vastly increase its algorithmic compressibility). These are referred to as emergent concepts. Temperature and entropy are examples of such concepts in thermodynamics.
These quantities can already be defined in statistical mechanics by means of the canonical or microcanonical probability distribution. Other thermodynamic variables are limited to a few statistical moments of the probability distribution, such as mean values and correlation functions, but this restriction is not the primary issue of concern. The problem is that temperature and entropy are defined operationally in thermodynamics via the properties of interacting subsystems. For example, temperature is defined operationally as what is measured by a thermometer, which is an open system that functions by interacting with its local environment for a long time (relative to the relaxation time) until they come to equilibrium. Of course, equilibrium is itself an emergent concept that never holds exactly in any real experiment.
In order to apply the statistical-mechanical definitions of temperature and entropy to such a situation, we must introduce subsystems [50, 51] and separate the energy of a closed system into several parts. The external energy includes the bulk kinetic energy of each subsystem and the macroscopic energy of interaction between the subsystems, such as the gravitational energy of interaction between small volume elements in a planet or star. The internal energy of each subsystem depends on its internal microscopic properties, the details of which are regarded as irrelevant in thermodynamics. The temperature and entropy of each subsystem are defined in terms of its internal energy. Both external and internal energy are thermodynamic variables.
What remains is the microscopic energy of interaction between subsystems. This is not a thermodynamic variable. It is ignored in thermodynamics even though it is nonzero in statistical mechanics. The justification for this is that all long-range interactions are assumed to have been included in the macroscopic energy of interaction. Thus, the microscopic energy of interaction may be regarded as a short-range surface effect, which becomes negligible in comparison to the internal energy of the subsystems (a volume effect) for regularly shaped subsystems in the thermodynamic limit. One could conceivably also argue that, on average, this energy should also vanish (or at least reach a minimum) in the limit of thermal equilibrium, independent of the thermodynamic limit. In either case, ignoring this energy makes it possible to formulate conservation of energy in terms of thermodynamic variables alone.
But this shows that the law of conservation of energy in thermodynamics contradicts the law of conservation of energy in statistical mechanics. These two laws can be reconciled only if we agree to ignore the microscopic energy of interaction. Of course, this approximation cannot be invoked outside this narrow context. The microscopic energy of interaction is essential, for instance, if we wish to describe the dynamics of nonequilibrium systems-it gives rise to the existence of heat transfers and the attainment of thermal equilibrium, both of which are essential to the empirical definitions of entropy and temperature.
The link thus established between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics is not trivial, due to the long range of the Coulomb interaction. One must define subsystems carefully so that all Coulomb terms can be clearly separated [52] into (1) long-range macroscopic effects that appear only in the external energy and (2) screened shortrange effective interactions that appear in both the internal energy and the microscopic energy of interaction. The emergence of temperature in thermodynamics therefore requires, in addition to the thermodynamic limit, another level of emergence in which well-defined subsystems with these properties emerge from a collection of charged particles.
The notion of a state in thermodynamics is thus fundamentally different from that in statistical mechanics, because the thermodynamic state has the presumed existence of subsystems with negligible microscopic energy of interaction built into its very foundations [50, 51] otherwise it is experimentally vacuous. This mandatory change in the definition of state is a key indicator that the thermodynamic temperature and entropy are truly emergent quantities. The essence of this constraint was already well understood by Gibbs in 1902 [53] .
Whether subsystems with the requisite properties can be defined also depends strongly on which phases of matter are present in the system. Different phases must be described by different thermodynamic variables, so the choice of thermodynamic variables is also connected with the definition of subsystems.
Hence, this example shows clearly that thermodynamics does not "obey the laws" of statistical mechanics in any case of practical relevance (i.e., for finite N ). The two theories may give very similar predictions if the conditions are right, but they remain logically contradictory. The contradiction can be tolerated only if we choose to ignore certain small but nonzero quantities. It is this choice that makes the difference, not the mere presence of "more."
The conflict between unitary dynamics and quantumstate reduction is no greater than that between the two laws of energy conservation in statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. In both cases the emergent theory contradicts basic properties of the fundamental theory. The conflict is resolved by identifying a suitable limit in which the contradiction can be ignored.
III. SCIENCE IS CONTRADICTORY
Secret, secret, close the doors! -R. P. Feynman [35] Many physicists are uneasy with the idea of drawing an analogy between thermodynamics and quantum mechanics. Bell, for example, has eloquently expressed the opinion [4] that quantum mechanics should be formulated "precisely," without reference to approximations or the concept of emergence. Bell is more than happy to use approximations in practical applications, but he feels they should play no role in the basic formulation of any theory that has aspirations to be fundamental.
There is, however, a case to be made for the claim that the most important characteristic of a fundamental theory is not "precision" but universality. A fundamental scientific theory should permit the existence, at least in principle, of all that we see around us, including scientists. In particular, it should allow the evolution of "information gathering and utilizing systems" [54] or protoscientists with the ability to profit from even the barest rudiments of the scientific method. But this points away from "precision" and toward the inclusion of emergence at the most fundamental level, because the scientific method is inherently self-contradictory.
The first requirement of science is that it should refer only to things that are objective, in the sense that they do not depend on the perspective of any observer. In quantum mechanics, this level is described by the unbroken symmetry of the quantum state vector, evolving unitarily in accordance with the Schrödinger equation.
The second requirement of science is that it should be capable of describing differences. The most primitive scientific statement is the bare observation that "this is different from that." But this requires some way of assigning meaning to this and that. In quantum mechanics, this is done by defining subsystems. However, there is no objective way to do this; subsystems are inherently contextual entities that always refer, at least implicitly, to the perspective of an observer.
The third requirement of science is that it should be capable of describing regularities. The laws of science refer only to what is repeatable. But no two things in this world are ever exactly the same, if only because they occur at different places or different times, and in different environments. A protoscientist will not get very far if it is only capable of being perpetually astounded by the newness of it all. Regularities come into existence only after the protoscientist declares what is relevant and what is irrelevant. In quantum mechanics, this is done in part by defining collective variables (to be discussed further below), and in part by discarding irrelevant portions of the quantum state during the reduction process. Regularities, the raw material of science, are therefore unavoidably subjective.
Hence, the most basic principles of the scientific method demand that science be simultaneously objective and subjective. The only way to combine these conflicting requirements in a single theory is to veil the contradictions using the technique of emergence. In this way the theory can be made weakly objective, in a sense to be defined below. This is reminiscent of the story of the emperor's new clothes [55] . The emperor (science) is forbidden to flaunt a naked contradiction in public. Clothing the emperor in metaphysics will not do, for there are many shrewd children in the audience; only mathematical garments suffice. The fig leaf of emergence may not be much, but it is all that we have and all that we need.
Various degrees of objectivity and subjectivity were defined by d'Espagnat [5, 14] ; the definitions adopted here are somewhat modified [56] . An overtly subjective theory is one that depends explicitly on the capabilities of individual protoscientists. An intersubjective theory depends on these capabilities, but all protoscientists are assumed to be roughly the same, which makes it possible for them to reach mutual understanding and agreement. A weakly objective theory is one that relies upon the concept of emergence, but the quantities thereby ignored are far below the resolution limits of the protoscientists, so the theory does not depend explicitly on the capabilities of protoscientists. Thermodynamics is weakly objective in this sense, because the coarse graining that is used to establish the second law of thermodynamics need not be tailored explicitly for the limitations of human observers. Weak objectivity strengthens intersubjective agreement by allowing protoscientists to avoid (for the most part) squabbles over solipsism. But an element of subjectivity always remains in a weakly objective theory. Zeh has described the ideal limit in which the quantities declared to be irrelevant do not refer directly to the knowledge of any actual observer as a process of "objectivization" of a subjective theory [57] . Zurek has stressed the importance of stability under environmental monitoring and the redundancy of records in many subsystems for an operational definition of objectivity [58, 59] . Both of these are examples of weak objectivity.
A strongly objective theory does not rely upon the concept of emergence as it is usually understood. Of course, any scientific theory must declare some things to be irrelevant in order to identify regularities, but in a strongly objective theory it is assumed that meaningful regularities can be identified by declaring arbitrarily small quantities of information to be irrelevant, so that nothing qualitatively new (e.g., quantum state reduction) need emerge. Bell advocated strong objectivity as the target for all respectable formulations of quantum mechanics [4] .
However, it seems unlikely that protoscientists could ever evolve if their information gathering is limited to arbitrarily weak regularities. There is not much profit in defining a "law" for regularities that are arbitrarily few and far between. To get the scientific enterprise off the ground, something more seems to be requiredsomething qualitatively new. This suggests that the concept of emergence may be unavoidable-a conclusion supported by the above observation that no examples of theories that are both empirically validated and nonemergent are known to exist at present.
Weak objectivity is therefore taken to be the primary goal of the present theory. Intersubjectivity would be allowed as a fallback position, but only if weak objectivity is found to be unattainable.
IV. THE REDUCTION PROCESS
Let us now consider the mathematical formulation of the measurement problem. The time evolution of the density operator ρ of a closed system is given by the Schrödinger equation as
in which ρ(t) is the value of ρ at time t, U (t, t ) = exp[−iH(t − t )/ ] is the time evolution operator, H is the Hamiltonian of the system, and ρ is assumed to be normalized (tr ρ = 1).
A. von Neumann reduction
However, according to von Neumann [1] , this unitary evolution is suspended during an ideal "projective" measurement of the operator
in which P i is a projection operator of rank one (d i ≡ tr P i = 1). These projectors are idempotent, hermitian, mutually orthogonal, and exhaustive:
The measurement effectively asks a set of yes-no questions-namely, whether the state ρ will be found to match the vector subspace defined by P i . At the time of the measurement, the unitary process (1) is replaced by the two-stage reduction process
in which
and
The first stage (4a) accounts for the elimination of interference, whereas the second stage (4b) describes the selection of an individual outcome. The probability of obtaining outcome (4b) is w i .
B. Lüders reduction
Von Neumann assumed that the measurement was maximally fine-grained in the sense that d i = 1. However, the outcome of the measurement is then ambiguous whenever the spectrum of Λ is degenerate (i.e., λ i = λ j for i = j), because the corresponding projectors P i and P j are not uniquely defined. To circumvent this problem, Lüders [60] replaced the reduced state (6) with
in which d i ≥ 1 is now allowed, but it is assumed that λ i = λ j for i = j. The probability of outcome (7) is still given by Eq. (5). The Lüders reduced state (7) minimizes the change ρ →ρ associated with a given projector set
The Lüders reduction rule has since been adopted almost universally in textbooks (e.g., [61, 62] ) for the case of projective measurements. The Lüders rule is sometimes attributed to von Neumann [2, 63] . However, von Neumann took a different approach to this problem that is rooted in epistemology rather than conservation of ρ. Since von Neumann's method [36] is rarely used in modern work on the measurement problem, discussion of his approach will be postponed to Sec. VII.
C. Closed systems
In traditional presentations of the theory of measurement, reduction is applied to an open system when it is "measured" from the outside by some other system that is not included in the quantum-mechanical description. In this paper, however, the theory is applied exclusively to closed systems in which measurement is just one type of interaction between subsystems. The projector set P describes properties of subsystems that are of interest to some protoscientist within the system, although the protoscientist may or may not be included explicitly as a subsystem (or a set of subsystems) in the mathematical definition of P. The objective is to find a way to formulate the reduction process as emergent, so that its conflict with the unitary dynamics (1) can be neglected.
It is assumed throughout that the information accessible to the protoscientist is limited to the outcomes (7) and their associated Born-rule probabilities (5) . However, at the outset, {w i } is to be regarded as just a set of numbers derived from the mathematical structure of Hilbert space. This set satisfies w i ≥ 0 and i w i = 1 by definition, but the concept of probability will emerge only after further theoretical developments. Nevertheless, in the interest of avoiding tortuous linguistic constructions, the language of probability theory will be used henceforth, interspersed with occasional comments indicating the progress along the path to emergence.
D. Subsystem projectors
The projector P i is henceforth defined as a product of subsystem projectors:
in which k labels the subsystems and i k is the k component of i = (i 1 , i 2 , . . .). P ki k is an extension of the subsystem projectorP ki k to the entire system:
in which 1 k is the identity operator for subsystem k and the set {P ki k } satisfies
The rank of P i is thus
The dimension of the subspace corresponding to subsystem k is
E. Microstates, macrostates, collective variables, and internal environments
In a typical measurement situation, the time evolution (1) generates correlations between the microstates of a subsystem k and the macrostates of a measuring apparatus k . Microstates and macrostates are just vector subspaces of different dimensions (
. For example, a macrostate may be defined as the set of all microstates in which the center of mass of the apparatus pointer lies within some given range of coordinates. The variables used to define the macrostate are called collective variables. For a macroscopic subsystem, the collective variables are often described by commuting operators that approximate the values of noncommuting observables, such as the center-of-mass position and momentum [1, 5, [64] [65] [66] [67] .
Other important collective variables include the order parameters for states of broken symmetry, which describe the emergence of distinct phases of matter [68] . These order parameters exhibit a generalized "rigidity" property [68, 69] that is said to arise from a "quantum protectorate" [23] . Such generalized rigidities are useful in defining the "pointer" variables of actual or hypothetical measuring apparatuses [68, 69] .
The different microstates within a given macrostate can be labeled using a set of internal variables. For example, suppose a hydrogen atom is known to occupy a subsystem consisting of a given volume in space. Suitable collective and internal coordinates are then the atomic center-of-mass position and the relative electron-proton separation, respectively. In textbooks, the Hilbert space of the hydrogen atom is usually decomposed into a tensor product of independent center-of-mass and relative coordinate spaces. This cannot be done exactly in the present example, because in a finite-volume subsystem, the set of possible relative coordinates depends on the position of the center of mass. Decomposing a subsystem into a tensor product of collective and internal subsystems therefore represents an approximation that may be emergent in certain limiting cases (such as, in this example, bound states of the hydrogen atom that are not too close to the subsystem boundaries).
If such a tensor-product decomposition is emergent, the internal subsystem is sometimes viewed as an internal environment of the collective subsystem. The collective subsystem then has both external and internal environments. The notion of an internal environment can also be used in a loose sense even when no such tensor-product decomposition is performed.
F. Integrated and isolated subsystems
A subsystem is said to be isolated if it interacts very weakly with other subsystems, so that its time evolution is nearly unitary, apart perhaps from occasional strong interactions with a measuring apparatus. A closed system, by contrast, interacts with nothing else at all.
Most macroscopic subsystems are practically impossible to isolate [70] ; isolation is therefore typically associated with microscopic subsystems. Exceptions to this rule include the subsystems associated with the phase order parameter of a superfluid or superconductor. A subsystem that is never isolated on any relevant timescale is referred to here as an integrated subsystem. Integrated subsystems are important for irreversibility in statistical mechanics [71] and the quantum theory of measurement [70, 72, 73] . Sometimes it is convenient to use the words "macroscopic" and "microscopic" as imprecise substitutes for "integrated" and "isolated," but the latter labels are used preferentially in the discussion that follows.
G. Ideal observers
One motivation sometimes given for the definition of macrostates is that a protoscientist or "macroscopic observer" [36] is assumed to be capable of distinguishing pure states in the subspace defined by P i from those in a different subspace P j , but incapable of distinguishing different states within a given subspace P i . The set (8) could thus be regarded as characterizing the capabilities of such an observer [36] . However, if the theory is to achieve the goal of being weakly objective (cf. Sec. III) rather than subjective, the macrostate projectors P i should be far more fine-grained than the resolving capabilities of any protoscientist using the theory [54] .
The projectors in a weakly objective theory can thus be taken to characterize the capabilities of an ideal observer whose powers of perception far exceed those of any existing protoscientist. Such an ideal observer is referred to here as a Gell-Mann-Hartle [74] (GMH) demon. This demon is of course imaginary. But the GMH demon, unlike Maxwell's or Laplace's demon, could exist, at least in principle, within the confines of ordinary quantum mechanics.
In this paper, the word "information" generally refers to the information accessible to a GMH demon (thus answering Bell's question [13] "whose information?" [75] ). Of course, the only actual information is that held by individual protoscientists. The GMH demon is just an idealization useful for describing the collective information potentially accessible to the community of protoscientists in a manner consistent with the goal of weak objectivity. The relationship between the GMH demon and the protoscientists is discussed further in Sec. XI.
H. Restriction to integrated subsystems
The definition (9) of P i as a product of subsystem projectors implicitly assumes that the reduction process consists of n reductions applied simultaneously to each of the individual subsystems. However, as discussed below in Sec. V, the time interval ∆t between reductions in a closed system must satisfy
in which τ dec is the decoherence time. This gives rise to a potential problem, in that different subsystems k generally have different decoherence times τ dec (k). The timescale τ dec in Eq. (14) for the simultaneous subsystem reduction generated by P i must therefore be understood as the upper bound
Although τ dec (k) is very small for typical macroscopic subsystems [9, [30] [31] [32] [33] , it is very large (effectively infinite) for isolated subsystems. For this reason, the compound projector (9) is initially assumed to include only integrated subsystems, and P ki k is assumed to refer only to macrostates. The special case of subsystem decompositions involving isolated subsystems will be treated separately in Sec. IX. Note that this temporary restriction to integrated subsystems does not mean that Schrödinger-cat-type problems cannot be described; it only means that any isolated subsystem must be absorbed into the definition of some integrated subsystem, rather than being treated as a separate entity.
I. Non-projective measurements
Measurements can also be described by operators that are not projectors, as part of the quantum operations formalism for open systems [76, 77] . However, such measurement operators are always equivalent to projectors acting in a larger Hilbert space. Since the present work deals only with closed systems, all measurements are taken here to be projective for simplicity. Nevertheless, the effect of such a measurement on an isolated subsystem of the closed system generally cannot be described using projection operators; this topic will be discussed further in Sec. IX C.
J. Is reduction "real"?
In the modern language of the histories formalism [54, [65] [66] [67] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] , the Lüders reduction is considered to be not a "real" process but just a convenient way of describing the probabilities that are relevant to a protoscientist within the given closed system [83, 84] . This way of thinking can be traced back to Everett [85] [86] [87] and arguably even to von Neumann himself [88] . However, any such "reduction-free" description must still explain how it is possible for a protoscientist to perceive that its experiences are described by the mathematics of reduction. Hence, the question of whether reduction should be called "real" is irrelevant; the key question is whether reduction is emergent.
V. EMERGENCE OF NONINTERFERENCE
The first step toward answering the latter question is to tackle the interference problem. This problem arises in the quantum-mechanical description of histories, the simplest example of which is the double-slit experiment. By convention, a "history" in quantum mechanics is often formally defined as a time-ordered product of Heisenbergpicture projection operators [54, [65] [66] [67] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] . Suppose, however, we define a history simply as a sequence of Lüders reductions applied at times t 1 < t 2 · · · < t f to some initial state ρ(t 0 ), where t 0 ≤ t 1 and ρ(t) evolves unitarily between reductions. We can then construct a probability distribution for these histories by applying the rules of classical probability theory to the conditional probabilities (5), without any need for the apparatus of decoherence functionals [54, 80] . There is also no need for consistency conditions [65-67, 78, 79] , because the sum rules of classical probability theory are satisfied automatically by construction.
However, this sequence of reductions can be used to describe a closed system only if the reductions do not interfere with each other. This means that, if we calculate the probability of a given outcome at the final time t f , conditioned on the given initial state ρ(t 0 ) but on no other information, we should get the same probability as if the reductions at the intermediate times t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t f −1 were not performed at all. Such a complete lack of interference is never exactly true for any problem of practical relevance, but it becomes a very good approximation in the limit (14) , in which ∆t = ∆t j = t j − t j−1 is the time interval between reductions. The decoherence time τ dec is state-dependent, but it is very fast for typical macroscopic subsystems. The resulting emergence of noninterference on the timescale (14) is the fundamental practical lesson of decoherence theory [9, [30] [31] [32] [33] . Within the limits defined by Eq. (14), reduction processes at intermediate times can be inserted or deleted without having any significant effect on the overall probability distribution.
Of course, the emergence of noninterference depends very sensitively on the choice of projector set P(t j ). The problem of defining suitable criteria for the selection of this set is known as the preferred-basis problem. Methods for addressing this problem are discussed in Sec. X.
As a summary of what has just been done, the rules for combining probabilities in classical probability theory were injected (from out of nowhere) into the formalism as a possible candidate for emergence. An appeal to the results of decoherence theory was then used to establish that such emergence (i.e., of the rules for combining probabilities) does indeed occur in the limit (14) , subject to the solution of the preferred-basis problem.
However, this emergence of noninterference does not imply the emergence of all of classical probability theory, because it does not imply the emergence of outcomes. The reason for this that noninterference is a property of probability distributions for histories, whereas the outcome of the reduction process is a quantum state. As shown below, the change of state during the Lüders reduction is generally not small enough to be described as emergent.
VI. TESTING CANDIDATES FOR THE EMERGENCE OF OUTCOMES
To test for the emergence of outcomes, we need to determine how much the state changes upon reduction. A convenient measure for this is the trace distance [77, 89] 
in which |X| = √ X † X. Some bounds on the relevant distances for the Lüders reduction are evaluated in Appendix A for the case in which ρ is a pure state (i.e., ρ 2 = ρ). As shown there, neither D(ρ,ρ) nor D(ρ, ρ i ) is small for the general case in which more than one value of w i is significant. This was to be expected, since otherwise the measurement problem would be trivial.
A. Emergence of determinism
Consider, however, the special case in which one outcome, say i = 1, is dominant: w 1 = 1 − , 1. As shown in Appendix A, D(ρ,ρ) and D(ρ, ρ 1 ) both vanish in the limit → 0, whereas D(ρ, ρ i =1 ) approaches 1. Thus, in this limit, the states ρ and ρ 1 are the same. If we agree to ignore all outcomes except i = 1, we can say that deterministic behavior has emerged. In this limit w i is either 0 or 1, so this corresponds to the emergence of Boolean logic rather than of probability theory [65] [66] [67] .
B. Collective variables and quasiclassical dynamics
The conditions needed to make this happen have been studied by Omnès [65] [66] [67] . It is possible only for certain special states ρ and projector sets P, the latter of which can be chosen so as to minimize D(ρ,ρ). The solution of this variation problem is beyond the scope of the present paper.
However, qualitatively correct solutions can often be obtained without going into the details of the variation problem. The key is to choose a set of collective variables that evolve slowly in time, so as to obtain approximately classical behavior [1, 54, 64-67, 80, 81] . In general, the concepts of symmetry breaking and order parameters play a crucial role in the selection of collective variables (cf. Sec. IV E). However, in common "hydrodynamic" situations the appropriate variables might simply consist of the number of particles in a small but macroscopic volume together with the center-of-mass position, total momentum, and internal energy of those particles. Once the quasiclassical variables have been chosen, subsystem projectors (10) can be defined corresponding to some given ranges of these variables and combined to obtain the overall projector (9) .
The resulting emergence of quasiclassical determinism is valid for systems whose behavior can be predicted accurately using classical mechanics [65] [66] [67] . It is, however, not valid for classically chaotic systems or for "Schrödinger cat" situations in which, say, w 1 = w 2 = 1/2. In these cases, D(ρ,ρ) and D(ρ, ρ i ) are not small and we must turn to other methods.
C. Change of metric
The crucial step in all cases of emergence is the choice of what to ignore. Given that the physical predictions of quantum mechanics are all based on probabilities, this choice can be made explicit by defining the quantity
in which Q is some given set of projectors [90] . The physical meaning of this definition can be seen by noting that for any two density operators ρ and σ,
The condition D Q (ρ, σ) = 0 is thus identical to the statement that ρ and σ give rise to the same probabilities for measurements of any projectors P ∈ Q. If measurements are restricted to observables that are linear combinations of these projectors, the density operators ρ and σ would therefore be operationally indistinguishable [16, 91] . The definition (17) is related to the trace distance (16) by [77, 89] 
in which the equality holds for all ρ and σ if and only if Q is dense in Q 0 , the set of all projectors. If this is not true, D Q (ρ, σ) is called a pseudometric, because it satisfies all of the criteria for a metric except the requirement that D Q (ρ, σ) = 0 implies ρ = σ. It can be converted into a metric if we regard it as defining a distance between equivalence classes, where ρ and σ belong to the same equivalence class if D Q (ρ, σ) = 0. The subject of equivalence classes is discussed below in Sec. VII.
D. Macroscopically local observables
A common choice for Q is the set L of projectors contained in the algebra of local (or quasilocal) "observables." In algebraic quantum mechanics, such observables are defined as operators with compact support in coordinate space (or, for relativistic problems, Minkowski space) [92, 93] . This definition is appropriate for mathematical investigations of limiting behavior [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] , but it is not suitable for use in any realistic theory of measurement. For the latter purpose, it is better to work with the algebra of macroscopically local observables, defined as those with a fixed upper bound on the spatial extent of nonlocality [97, 98] .
Gottfried has given an insightful analysis of the measurement problem in which this set is applied to the case of a Stern-Gerlach experiment that measures the spin of an atom [98] . In his approach, the initial state ρ(t a ) at time t a is the outcome of a state-preparation or reduction process. This state evolves in accordance with Eq.
(1) until t b = t a + ∆t, at which time ρ(t b ) is reduced to obtainρ(t b ). The purpose of Gottfried's analysis is to show that this reduction is justified by the fact that
for sufficiently large ∆t, in which L is the set of projectors contained in the algebra of macroscopically local observables. In order to achieve this, the projector set P b = P(t b ) is chosen so as to partition the center of mass of the atom into macroscopically distinct regions. This could be regarded as the solution of a variation problem, in which P b is varied so as to minimize
If we accept Gottfried's claim that "all known observables" are macroscopically local [98] , the result (20) would seem to be an important first step (but not a complete solution-see Sec. VII) towards establishing the emergence of outcomes, at least in this special case. However, this claim made Bell "quite uncomfortable" [13] , and for good reason. The explicit reference to locality in coordinate space is a statement about what is observable to humans. The preferred-basis problem is thereby not solved, it is merely eliminated by fiat.
However, as Anderson has stressed, the "pointer" of a measuring apparatus need not point to anything in coordinate space; it could, at least in principle, be based on a generalized concept of "rigidity" involving, say, the phase variable of liquid helium [68, 69] . Such phases can only be perceived by humans if they are measured by a more traditional apparatus whose pointer is macroscopically local in coordinate space [99] , but Anderson speculates that they could perhaps be perceived directly by a computer "made entirely out of Josephson junctions" [69] .
The reference to macroscopic locality thus introduces a subjective element into the theory. It is desirable to see whether this element of subjectivity can be eliminated by defining Q in a different way.
E. Are local "observables" actually observed?
Another reason to be uncomfortable with relying on the set L is that the projectors in L do not always correspond directly to the outcome of any experiment. The experimentally accessible quantities in quantum mechanics are (with some qualifications to be explored in detail below) the reduced states ρ i and their associated probabilities w i . These quantities are directly related to the projectors P i appearing in the set P b referred to above. However, these projectors do not necessarily belong to L; as noted above, the set P b is defined by the requirement that it minimize
In the language of algebraic quantum mechanics, the set P b that defines the basis in which ρ(t b ) andρ(t b ) become equivalent in the sense of Eq. (20) belongs to the set of macroscopic classical observables, not to the set of local observables [94] [95] [96] . The former is generally not a subset of the latter [94] [95] [96] .
Hence, the choice Q = L represents somewhat of a diversion from the physical motivation given for the introduction of D Q (ρ, σ), because the probabilities associated with projectors in L are not necessarily probabilities of any experimental outcome. The "observables" in L are thus actually a class of (partially) hidden variables introduced in order to facilitate the solution of the measurement problem. But this calls into question the significance of the results obtained from minimization of
It is therefore of interest to see whether the problem can be reformulated in terms of a set Q that is more closely connected to experimental outcomes. This can be achieved by replacing the criterion of macroscopic locality with that of dynamical stability, as outlined below.
F. Dynamical stability
The concept of dynamical stability has played an important role in decoherence theory from the very beginning [70, 100] . It has roots in the criteria of stability [101] and predictability [102] used to define notions of "reality" by the founders of quantum mechanics. Dynamical stability can be implemented here by replacing the choice Q = L in Sec. VI D with Q = P a , where P a = P(t a ) is the set of projectors used in the reduction process that generated the initial state ρ(t a ).
The reason why this corresponds to a criterion of dynamical stability can be seen by noting that D Pa [ρ(t b ),ρ(t b )] = 0 if P b = P a , due to the idempotence of the Lüders reduction process. In general, P must depend on time, so we have at best
when P b ≈ P a . This corresponds to the case of projectors that vary slowly with time, in the sense that the interval ∆t between reductions can be chosen to satisfy [cf. Eq.
]
where τ P is the timescale for changes in P. Hence, the criterion (21) can be used to select projector sets P that are stable over time intervals long in comparison to the decoherence time.
Unlike the situation in Sec. VI D, here the set P b is not regarded as a quantity to be varied in order to minimize D Pa [ρ(t b ),ρ(t b )], because that would yield only the trivial time-independent solution P b = P a . The selection of P b (i.e., the solution of the preferred-basis problem) is instead governed by a separate variational principle.
For the moment, the preferred-basis problem is set aside, to be taken up again in Sec. X. The question of immediate concern is, rather, what precisely is the outcome of the reduction process?
VII. EMERGENCE OF OUTCOMES IN INTEGRATED SUBSYSTEMS A. Density operators have too much information
This question would seem to have an obvious answer: The outcome at time t j is the reduced state ρ i in Eq. (7). The problem with this answer is that we never actually know what ρ i (t j ) is; we only know that it is some state that belongs to the manifold
Whatever this state is, it then evolves unitarily until the time of the next reduction, yielding another unknown state ρ(t j+1 ). The only connection between the pre-reduction state ρ(t j+1 ) and experiment is the set {w i (t j+1 )}, in which w i (t j+1 ) is the predicted probability (5) of obtaining an outcome in M i (t j+1 ). The outcome of an experiment is therefore ill-defined if we take the quantum state to be a density operator ρ. The crux of the problem is that ρ contains too much information. As noted in Sec. VI C, the operator ρ would be completely determined if we knew the value of tr(P ρ) for a complete set of projectors P [5, 103] . This information can be obtained for an assembly of open isolated systems by the technique known as quantum-state tomography, as described in Sec. IX E.
However, we [104] never have access to complete information about the state of a closed system [105] . In such a system, which is by definition unique, we can only obtain information about ρ at the reduction times t j . The information thus obtained is limited to the outcomes M i , which can be used to test the probabilities w i calculated from Eq. (5). That is, our experimental information can only make contact with the values of tr(P ρ) for all P ∈ P, in which P is the set (8) used to perform the reduction. This set is not fixed a priori ; it is contingent upon the dynamical solution of the preferred-basis problem (see Sec. X). But at any given time, we have access to the values of tr(P ρ) only for one particular set P, not for all conceivable sets P. (This is also true for an ensemble of open integrated systems, as discussed in Sec. VIII.) This is the basic limitation imposed by Bohr's principle of complementarity [106] , which can be summarized in the statement that "unperformed experiments have no results" [107] .
B. Equivalence classes
If all of the information we have about ρ at some given time is contained in the set of probabilities {w i } in Eq. (5), then we cannot distinguish ρ from any other state σ that gives rise to the same set {w i }. This indistinguishability can be expressed by defining an equivalence relation between density operators. We say that ρ and σ are equivalent with respect to the set P, denoted ρ ∼ σ (P),
(24a)
The equivalence class of ρ with respect to P is then defined as the set
The motivation for this is that an ideal but physically possible observer-a GMH demon-is assumed to be capable of distinguishing states in the manifold M i from those in another manifold M j , but incapable of distinguishing different states within M i . The set (8) can thus be regarded as characterizing the capabilities of the GMH demon. All states σ ∈ [ρ] are indistinguishable to the demon. If we wish to obtain a description that is logically consistent with the capabilities of even such an ideal observer, we should therefore redefine the quantum state as the equivalence class [ρ] itself [36] [37] [38] .
Note that the definition of quantum states as equivalence classes is already well established as a basic feature of standard quantum mechanics. For example, in ordinary wave mechanics, the so-called "wave function" is actually an equivalence class of functions that are equal almost everywhere (i.e., except on sets of Lebesgue measure zero) [108] . More generally, the quantum state is defined as a probability measure on a set of projectors [109] . Under certain conditions, this definition leads to a one-to-one correspondence between quantum states and density operators [109] . However, in systems with exact superselection rules, this correspondence is broken, and the quantum state can only be identified as an equivalence class of density operators [110] . It is therefore not surprising that the same should be true in systems with emergent environment-induced superselection rules [31, 111] .
The equivalence class (24) has several noteworthy properties. For any density operator ρ we have
in whichρ is the Lüders reduced state defined in Eqs.
(4a) and (7). That is, ρ andρ are always equivalent. However, there are significant advantages to redefiningρ at this point as [36] 
thereby extending von Neumann's original definition [see Eqs. (4a) and (6) ] to the case of tr P i ≥ 1. This definition still satisfies Eq. (25), but it also satisfies the much stronger condition (26) is also reflected in the maximum-entropy property
is the von Neumann entropy [1] . The property (28) is a consequence of Eq. (27) and the inequality [36]
the latter of which also holds for the Lüders reduced state [77] . The equality in (28) or (30) holds if and only if σ =ρ or ρ =ρ [36] , respectively. Further properties of the definition (26) are easily derived. For the special case of a projector in the set P, we get simplyP
which implies that the operation (26) is idempotent:
Also, for any pure state χ i that belongs to the manifold M i defined by P i , we havê
Given that the equivalence class [ρ] can be represented mathematically by the reduced stateρ, these results indicate that the basic dynamical entity of the theory is not the pure state but the projector P i . This projector represents its own equivalence class, due to Eq. (31).
C. Modified reduction process
If we follow this approach, the Lüders reduced state (7) in the reduction process (4) should be replaced by
in which d i = tr P i . This is just a generalization of von Neumann's reduced state (6) to the case d i ≥ 1. The reduction process defined by Eqs. (4) and (34) could be regarded as implicit in von Neumann's work, because he devoted a significant portion of Ref.
[1] to a study of the implications of the reduced state (26) for the increase of entropy predicted by the second law of thermodynamics [36] . However, von Neumann always wrote his reduction process in the form of Eqs. (4) and (6), with d i = 1.
To the best of my knowledge, the first authors to write down Eqs. (4) and (34) explicitly were Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi [112] (see also Refs. [95, 113] ). In view of this ambiguous heritage, I shall refer to this process as the vN-DLP reduction.
There is a subtlety here in that different members of an equivalence class are not equivalent with respect to dynamics, because the projectors P i generally do not commute with the Hamiltonian H [36] . Different members of an initial equivalence class therefore evolve differently during the time interval between reductions, and at the time of the next reduction they will generally belong to different equivalence classes. This dynamical lack of information can be accounted
Defining this probability distribution requires the introduction of some new principle that is foreign to quantum mechanics per se. One possible candidate is the principle of maximum entropy, which in an informationtheory context represents the policy of being "maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information" [114] . But according to Eq. (28) this corresponds to the choice σ i =ρ i = ρ i , thus leading back once again to the formulation given in Eq. (34) . This choice is adopted in what follows.
D. Emergence of classical probability
The crucial question now is whether the reduction process defined by Eqs. (4) and (34) is emergent. To address this question, note that the essential information content of the equivalence class (24) is contained in the set of probabilities {w i }, which can be represented by a vector w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . .). can then be defined as the Kolmogorov distance [115] or classical trace distance [77] between w and w :
As noted above, [ρ] can also be represented mathematically byρ. Butρ andρ commute (for fixed P), so the trace distance (16) between them is identical to Eq. (36):
Hence, these two measures of distance are the same. The essential difference between the representationsρ and w of [ρ] is thatρ can be used as an initial condition for the unitary dynamics (1), whereas w cannot. From these results we see immediately that The first stage (4a) of the reduction process is therefore emergent. But this is sufficient to establish the emergence of outcomes, because the interpretation ofρ as a statistical mixture of distinct outcomes can now be imposed on Eq. (26) without generating any noticeable conflict with unitary dynamics-in which "noticeable" is defined with respect to the metrics (36) and (37) . It should be stressed that this interpretation is imposed on Eq. (26), not derived from it. Bell has argued that it would be more natural to interpret equations of the type (26) as a simultaneous coexistence of the projectors P i -i.e., to interpret the summation in Eq. (26) as a classical "and" rather than a classical "or" [13] . But this argument only carries weight if we assume that our goal is to derive the emergent theory from the base-level theory. It is not. This is never the goal in any true case of emergence, which always requires reconciliation of contradictions between the two levels of theory.
Here it may also be objected [13] that this is "not the proof of a theorem, but a change of the theory-at a strategically well chosen point." In other words, we have only managed to win the game by moving the goalposts. This is true, but it is also true that this is always how the game of emergence is played and won. Nothing ever emerges until we have chosen what to ignore.
The interpretation ofρ as a statistical mixture means that the Hilbert-space weights w i in Eq. (5) have now emerged as classical probabilities. However, because the closed system under consideration is not a member of any ensemble, they are probabilities only in the Bayesian sense of plausible reasoning in the face of incomplete information [116, 117] , not in the "frequentist" sense of frequencies in an ensemble. But in order to connect w i with experiment, it is necessary to introduce ensembles and statistical frequencies. This connection will be developed below in Sec. VIII.
The second stage (4b) of the vN-DLP reduction accounts for the selection of one outcome ρ i from among the many possibilities present inρ. The distance (36) corresponding to this process is
This becomes small only in the deterministic limit w i ≈ 1 considered previously in Sec. VI A. It is not small for the general case in which no value of w i is close to 1. But this simply means that the change in a probability distribution is always significant whenever we update it to account for the acquisition of new information (where new information is, by definition, considered to be unexpected). It has no bearing on the emergence of outcomes, because the outcomes have already emerged.
E. Meaning of the results
What is the meaning of the vN-DLP reduction process? Here an analogy with statistical mechanics is again helpful. In the context of Gibbs's famous ink-in-water example [53] , the Schrödinger dynamics (1) generates a mixing of these fluids. But due to the conservation of the eigenvalues of ρ by the unitary process (1)-analogous to the incompressibility of the fluids-it is well known that the second law of thermodynamics can only be recovered if the microscopic state of the fluid is repeatedly "reduced" by coarse graining or some other type of information loss [57, 73, 118] . The Lüders reduction is one example of this type of coarse graining.
However, if the state of the system is to be described by equivalence classes, we should take the reduced statesρ and ρ i to be given not by the specific expressions (4a) and (7) but by the corresponding equivalence classes. The introduction of equivalence classes thus represents a further stage of coarse graining, in which the excess information contained in Eq. (7) is discarded. In practice, however, this cumbersome two-step coarse-graining process is jettisoned in favor of the single definition (34) . It was precisely this question of agreement with the second law of thermodynamics that motivated von Neumann to consider the reduced state (26) .
In the Lüders reduction, some coherence between the components of the initial quantum state ρ generally survives the reduction process, as long as tr P i > 1. For the quasiclassical projectors that describe our everyday experiences, typically ρ "is not reduced very much" [83] . However, in the vN-DLP reduction, the initial state ρ is replaced in its entirety by a normalized projector (34) at each reduction. The state prior to the last reduction is completely forgotten. In other words, all information about what is going on inside the equivalence classes is renounced at each step of the process. This is in better accord with the information-theory principle of being "maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information" [114] .
Of course, given that the projectors P i describe the capabilities of the GMH demon, any protoscientist using the theory will describe the experimental outcome as a partial reduction that is intermediate between (4a) and (4b). That is, the empirical reduced state will be a statistical mixture of states ρ i that is narrower than Eq. (4a) but still includes many different ρ i .
Zeh has cautioned against interpreting the reduction process as a "mere increase of information" [30, 57, 119, 120] , in the sense of merely selecting an outcome from some preexisting ensemble. One reason for this is that applying reduction to a closed system when decoherence is not yet complete (i.e., when the "measurement" is still in practice reversible) leads to results in conflict with experiment [121] . Another reason is that the outcomes are not preexisting; they emerge dynamically from the solutions of the preferred-basis problem (see Sec. X).
Bub has suggested that arguments for the equivalence of ρ andρ cannot solve the measurement problem, because ρ andρ are equivalent "only from the point of view of a specific observer" [122] . However, in the present theory, this observer is the GMH demon, thereby establishing the weak objectivity of the theory. The equivalence of ρ andρ is also bolstered by the criterion of dynamical stability developed in Sec. VI F. If one insists on nothing less than strong objectivity, then it is true that the measurement problem is insoluble. But as argued in Sec. III, the requirement of strong objectivity is incompatible with the scientific method itself.
Von Neumann showed that the reduction defined by Eqs. (4a) and (34) can be written mathematically as a product of two maximally fine-grained reductions of type (6) , in which the rank-one projectors within each equivalence class are chosen to form complementary sets and the time interval ∆t between reductions is set to zero [36] . Such a product has been called a "coherence destroying" measurement [63] . However, it must be stressed that the vN-DLP reduction cannot be interpreted physically as a sequence of two conventional measurements, because ∆t cannot be zero for measurements of noncommuting observables [78] [recall ∆t τ dec in Eq. (22)]. The limit ∆t → 0 is a singular limit that gives rise to new physics-in this case, a conventional reduction followed by a renouncement of all information that would distinguish between the states within an equivalence class.
It is interesting to note that when the reduction process is defined by Eqs. (4) and (34) , both the quantum state and all observables of the type (2) are functions of the projectors P i . The emergence of outcomes in a set of integrated subsystems thus leads to a convergence between Schrödinger's concept of state and Heisenberg's concept of observable, in a manner highly reminiscent of classical mechanics.
In a certain sense this may be considered as a trivialization of the measurement problem [123] , given the longstanding focus on the question of how to deal with the freedom of the experimenter to measure any of several possibly noncommuting observables [76, 106, [124] [125] [126] . However, it should be kept in mind that the projectors P i are not arbitrary; they depend on the solution of the preferred-basis problem. As shown in Sec. X, this problem can be formulated as a highly nontrivial variation problem known as the predictability sieve. Questions about the measurement of noncommuting observables are also relevant only in the case of isolated subsystems, which have not yet been included in the theory. This question will therefore be revisited in Sec. X E, after the necessary concepts have been developed.
F. Historical remarks
Most of the ideas described in Sec. VII B were introduced by von Neumann [36] . He discussed Eq. (26) extensively [36] , but he always expressed his reduction rule (4a) in terms of Eq. (6) rather than Eq. (34). However, it seems clear that von Neumann thought of himself as having formulated the latter rule [127] . Perhaps he did not write it down explicitly because he considered the concept of reduction to become trivial in this case (cf. Jauch [37, 38] ), due to the identity
Jauch also strongly emphasized the importance of equivalence classes for the measurement problem [37, 38] . However, he used the Lüders reduction instead of the vN-DLP reduction, which corresponds to a different kind of equivalence class [43] . It is not clear whether this was a deliberate choice, because Jauch did not mention von Neumann's prior work in this area. This is somewhat surprising given that Jauch has acknowledged that much of his research is an "elaboration of [the] work of von Neumann" [128] .
From a modern perspective, the main element missing from Jauch and von Neumann's work on equivalence classes is a connection with the concepts of decoherence theory. Integrating these concepts into the theory leads to a recognition that equivalence classes are contingent, dynamically evolving entities and that integrated and isolated subsystems must be treated differently (see Sec. IX). Also, neither Jauch nor von Neumann used the criterion of dynamical stability (cf. Sec. VI F) to motivate their introduction of equivalence classes.
Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi [112] used ergodic theory to derive the reduced state (34) from the timeaveraged dynamics of a microscopic system interacting with a macroscopic apparatus (see also Prosperi [95, 113] ). However, in the present theory, Eq. (34) is not used to describe isolated subsystems (see Sec. IX).
VIII. EMERGENCE OF STATISTICAL FREQUENCIES
In the previous section, it was noted that, for the GMH demon, the outcome of an experiment is to be identified with the manifold M i generated during the reduction process, and the comparison between theory and experiment is mediated entirely by the predicted set of probabilities {w i }. However, up to this point, no connection between individual outcomes and probabilities has yet been established. The transition between these two modes of description involves another level of emergence.
To describe this type of emergence, one must introduce a qualitatively new concept, that of the ensemble. This is most conveniently done by working with histories (see Sec. V) and defining an ensemble of subhistories. Each subhistory h is defined with reference to a particular subsystem and covers a finite interval of time. The subhistories can be arranged in parallel (different subsystems during the same time interval) or in series (the same subsystem during different time intervals) or any combination of the two. This physical ensemble is not yet a statistical ensemble, because its subhistories are not independent. Each subsystem in the parallel ensemble, for example, belongs to the environment of all the others. Independence of the ensemble elements can only be achieved if we declare the interactions between them to be irrelevant; this is put into practice by, in part, coarse-graining over the environment of each subsystem. Ignoring such differences between subhistories is the key to converting a physical ensemble into a (finite) statistical ensemble.
The definition of environments is therefore essential to the construction of ensembles and, consequently, to the gathering of information by "information gathering and utilizing systems." It is thus doubtful whether it is possible to formulate a self-consistent theory of such systems in which the concept of environment is dismissed on the grounds that it is "artificial or poorly defined" [129] .
From this point on, the arguments leading to the emergence of statistical frequencies are well known [85, [130] [131] [132] [133] [134] [135] . For example, one can define a frequency operator for the ensemble [130] [131] [132] [133] [134] , the eigenvalues of which become ever more narrowly distributed around the Bornrule subhistory probabilities w h as the number of ensemble elements increases. In the limit of an infinite ensemble, we can say that w h emerges as a well-defined statistical frequency. The rules of classical probability theory can then be used to compare these values with the probabilities w i in Eq. (5).
But in order for this to have any meaning in a real (finite) ensemble, we must agree to ignore all "maverick" histories in which the observed frequencies deviate substantially from the norm. Such a choice is fundamental to the concept of probability, and it cannot be derived from anything else [134, 136] . That is, it represents a true case of emergence.
Note that the statistical frequencies of the ensemble can only be meaningfully compared with the subhistory probabilities {w h } if the projector sets P h are the same for each subhistory in the ensemble. The limitation to a single set of projectors discussed in Sec. VII A for the case of a closed system is therefore also applicable to the case of an ensemble of open integrated subsystems.
IX. PARTIAL REDUCTIONS AND ISOLATED SUBSYSTEMS
Let us now examine the consequences of relaxing the restriction to integrated subsystems imposed at the end of Sec. IV F. The purpose of that restriction was to circumvent difficulties arising from widely divergent decoherence times τ dec (k) for different subsystems k. If these decoherence times differ greatly, it becomes necessary to consider reductions involving only a few subsystems at a time, rather than the reduction of all subsystems at once. Subsystems to be reduced are placed in a set A, while all other subsystems belong to the complementary set B.
A. Partial reductions
A partial reduction of the subsystems in set A can be generated by choosing all projectors (9) in the set (8) such that for all k ∈ B, the set {P ki k } contains only the single element 1 k . Such projectors then take the form
in which P A i acts only in A. The decoherence time (15) is likewise replaced with that of set A:
Note, however, that simply using the projector (40) in the theory of Sec. VII does not yield the desired results, because this would generate a complete reduction in which the subsystem states k ∈ B are all reduced to 1 k . A separate theory of partial reductions is therefore necessary. The root of the problem can be seen by noting what would happen if we simply use the set (8) in the equivalence class (24) . All members of a given equivalence class [ρ] would then have identical probabilities (5). However, this criterion alone is insufficient to define the concept of a partial reduction, because it does not impose any constraint on the subsystems in B. A partial reduction that is applied only to the subsystems in A should minimize changes in the subsystems in B. This can be achieved by imposing a stronger constraint in which membership in [ρ] is defined also by the values of the operators tr A (ρP i ). Here tr A σ denotes a partial trace of σ over the subsystems in A, the result of which is an operator in B.
B. Equivalence class and reduction process
With this in mind, the equivalence class of ρ for a partial reduction generated by the set (8) can be defined as [cf. Eq. (24)]
As before, the quantum state is identified with [ρ] . The associated reduced state (26) can then be correspondingly redefined aŝ The concept of indirect reduction of a microscopic subsystem by a macroscopic apparatus was elucidated by Landau and Lifshitz [137] . Their reduction process is formulated in terms of the relative-state expansion for pure states popularized by Everett [85, 86] . The expression forρ in Eq. (43) [39] [40] [41] [42] .
As shown in Appendixes B and C, the definition (43) ofρ shares many of the properties of the reduced state (26) described in Sec. VII B. The most important of these are Eqs. (25) , (27) , and (28), which establish that [ρ] can be represented mathematically byρ.
One may wonder whether the definition (42) contradicts the justification given for the introduction of equivalence classes in Sec. VII B, because membership in [ρ] is no longer defined exclusively by empirically meaningful probabilities [139] . However, the theory of Sec. VII is not (and cannot be) formulated entirely in terms of such probabilities, because the state ρ is required to follow unitary dynamics (1) during the intervals between reductions. The additional constraints on equivalenceclass membership imposed in Eq. (42) merely require the B component of ρ to adhere as closely as possible to this unitary dynamics-complete adherence being impossible due to the effect of indirect reduction.
Given that [ρ] is no longer defined solely by probabilities, no simple expression of the type shown in Eq. (36) can be given for the distance between equivalence classes. However, this distance can still be defined as the trace distance between the class representatives [cf. Eq. All of the qualitative conclusions in Sec. VII regarding the emergence of outcomes can therefore be carried over to the case of partial reductions.
C. Isolated subsystems
An isolated subsystem (cf. Sec. IV F) may be defined as one that effectively never decoheres:
Such subsystems are permanently excluded from A. Their states are therefore reduced only indirectly [137] , most commonly during measurement situations in which the state of the subsystem becomes strongly correlated with the state of a macroscopic measuring apparatus. The recognition that an indirect reduction is as good as a direct reduction [102, 140] played a significant role in the history of quantum mechanics, leading Bohr to abandon the local "disturbance" concept previously associated with measurement [106] . This was also the motivation for the use of the conditional states ρ B i in the definition of quantum discord [39] [40] [41] [42] .
The apparatus can perform a measurement only if it is an integrated subsystem [72, 73, 124, 141] , because this is what allows it to undergo the decoherence necessary for the emergence of definite outcomes [69] . This point was stressed by Heisenberg [142] : "The measuring device deserves this name only if it is in close contact with the rest of the world, if there is an interaction between the device and the observer. . . . If the measuring device would be isolated from the rest of the world, it would be neither a measuring device nor could it be described in the terms of classical physics at all."
Although the direct reduction of isolated subsystems is not part of the basic formalism of the present theory, such reduction processes can sometimes be inserted "by hand" into a history without generating any interference problems. However, these optional insertions can often be done in different ways that are mutually inconsistent or complementary (i.e., the additional reductions are consistent with noninterference individually but not jointly). This possibility has led to much debate over the meaning of the histories formalism [14, 65-67, 79, 143-148] . In response, Omnès [65, 66] introduced a distinction between "true" events (which in the present context are those arising from direct reduction of an integrated subsystem, including the consequent indirect reduction of isolated subsystems) and "reliable" or "trustworthy" events (those arising from direct reduction of an isolated subsystem). The latter have an inferior status because they are subjective-they do not generate interference, but they are essentially controlled by the whims of the theorist. This may be taken as justification for the Copenhagen practice of ascribing meaning to the properties of isolated subsystems only in the context of their interactions with a measuring apparatus. In what follows, it is assumed that isolated subsystems are reduced only indirectly.
Of course, even Landau and Lifshitz found it convenient to introduce a linear operator in B (generally not a projection operator) to describe the effect of indirect reduction on isolated subsystems [137] . In the present case, such a description could be implemented using the quantum operations formalism discussed in Sec. IV I. However, this is only an alternative mathematical way of expressing the same physics of information acquisition. At the fundamental level, the reduction of isolated subsystems remains an indirect process.
D. Partially isolated subsystems
Thus far we have considered explicitly only integrated subsystems, which are directly reduced at every reduction time t j , and isolated subsystems, which are never directly reduced. Of course, the theory in Sec. IX B can also be applied to partially isolated subsystems, which are directly reduced occasionally but not always. However, this case brings in no qualitatively new features, so it is not discussed further here.
E. Quantum-state tomography
In Sec. VII A, it was noted that the usual textbook description of quantum-state tomography [5, 103] , in which the density operator ρ is determined by "measuring" the value of tr(P ρ) for a complete set of projectors P , is not applicable to the case of a closed system, nor can it be used to find the density operator of an open integrated subsystem. The reason for this is that the only projectors that can be "measured" in such cases are those belonging to the orthogonal set that defines the reduction that actually occurs at a given time. Such an orthogonal set is never complete in the relevant sense, because it defines only an equivalence class of density operators, not a unique density operator.
The definition of a unique density operator by means of quantum-state tomography can, however, be achieved for an assembly of open isolated subsystems through the use of indirect reductions. The state is first prepared by performing an indirect reduction generated by some given measuring apparatus. An assembly of identically prepared subsystems is then allowed to interact with various other types of apparatus. If the indirect reductions generated by these apparatuses can be formally described as equivalent to direct reductions that form a complete set of operators, the density operator of the isolated subsystem is thereby defined uniquely.
Note that the assembly considered here is not an ensemble in the sense defined in Sec. VIII. An assembly of identically prepared isolated subsystems interacting with identical apparatuses forms an ensemble, because its statistical frequencies can be meaningfully compared with theoretical probabilities. However, no such direct comparison is possible for an assembly of isolated subsystems interacting with different apparatuses. Such an assembly is, rather, a collection of different (in general complementary) statistical ensembles. [149] has criticized Jauch's [37] use of equivalence classes to describe an isolated subsystem interacting with a measuring apparatus on the grounds that secondary measurements performed by another apparatus for the purpose of distinguishing between the members of such an equivalence class are difficult but not fundamentally impossible. According to this argument, one cannot say that the description of experimental outcomes as equivalence classes is objective even in a weak sense, because an inconsistency in the theoretical description could be demonstrated if a secondary measurement of this type is performed. Bub [122] has also criticized the theory of Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi [112] on similar grounds.
A rejoinder to such anticipated criticism was given already by Jauch [37] on the basis of Bohr's oft-repeated statement that the very possibility of measurement implies a classical apparatus. Although there is a kernel of truth in this statement, such a terse reply is less than fully satisfying. Here this question is examined from the perspective of decoherence theory, which provides a more complete answer.
The basic issue is that in order to demonstrate that the isolated subsystem and primary apparatus are in an entangled state rather than a statistical mixture, it is necessary to isolate this composite system so that it does not become entangled with its environment. Assuming that this can be done, the composite system does not decohere; it therefore plays the same role as the isolated subsystem in Sec. IX C. That is, it is reduced only indirectly, as a consequence of its interaction with the secondary apparatus. But the isolation of the primary apparatus from the outside world means that it no longer functions as a measuring device [72, 73, 124, 141] (see the quotation from Heisenberg in Sec. IX C). The secondary apparatus is, of course, presumed to be integrated, so that it can decohere and perform its function as a measuring device.
Therefore, the relevant point is not that measuring non-collective variables of a measuring apparatus is difficult, but rather that doing so requires an entirely different experimental arrangement. Even if future advances in technology allow such demanding experiments to be performed, this would have no bearing on the question of whether the original experiment was consistently described. The decisive concept is once again that "unperformed experiments have no results" [106, 107] .
G. Classical and quantum measurements
The basic issue can be restated concisely using the concepts of classical and quantum measurements. A classical measurement is what we infer from the correlations between the states of two integrated subsystems. A quantum measurement is what we infer from the correlations between the states of an isolated subsystem and an integrated subsystem.
Any number of classical measurements can be concatenated without changing the experimental arrangement. But a quantum measurement of a quantum measurement is a contradiction in terms, because a measuring apparatus cannot be isolated by definition. Attempting to isolate a quantum measuring apparatus so that it can be subjected to a quantum measurement changes the entire experimental arrangement. The modified experimental arrangement is therefore irrelevant to the question of whether the original experiment was consistently described.
X. THE PREFERRED-BASIS PROBLEM
The preferred-basis problem was set aside at the end of Sec. VI F in order to focus on the problem of outcomes. Let us now reexamine the former problem in the light of what has been learned since then. The goal is to find a way of dealing with the preferred-basis problem that is consistent with the concept of dynamical stability introduced in Sec. VI F.
A. The predictability sieve
Zurek has developed a variational method for this purpose known as the "predictability sieve" [32, 58, 150, 151] , in which projectors at an initial time t a are chosen so as to yield the most predictable results (in a sense to be described below) at some later time t b = t a +∆t. This section describes a modified version of the predictability sieve that is better suited for use with the reduction process defined by Eqs. (4) and (43) . Note that the times t a and t b used here are different from those in Secs. VI D and VI F [152] .
The basic idea of the modified predictability sieve is quite simple. Let ρ(t a ) be the density operator at time t a . At this time, we can use some given set of projectors (8) to define the reduced states ρ i (t a ) in Eq. (43) . Let these states evolve unitarily until the final time t b , yielding
At this time, the first stage (4a) of a second reduction is performed using the same projector set P, yielding the reduced statesρ i (t b ). The modified predictability sieve requires us to choose P so as to minimize the functional
the value of which is the mean entropy generated after the first reduction. This is the same as the mean entropy generated by the second reduction:
because the unitary evolution (46) does not change the entropy. This functional therefore satisfies G ≥ 0, due to the inequality (30) . Note that the entropy generated within each manifold M A i (defined by the projector P A i ) has already been maximized as a consequence of the definition of the reduced state (43) . Since a change of states within M A i is regarded as an irrelevant change of internal variables, the minimization of G can be viewed as a minimization of the remaining macroscopic entropy generated by any changes in the collective variables.
Why is this called a predictability sieve? Minimization of the entropy-generation functional (47) means that the nonvanishing conditional probabilities for the second reduction are concentrated on the smallest possible number of manifolds M A j ; the evolution of the states ρ i (t) after the first reduction is therefore as close to deterministic as possible.
This has the side effect of maximizing correlations between subsystems, because uncorrelated subsystems would have probabilities spread over more manifolds M A j . The predictability sieve therefore tends to generate a redundancy of records in different subsystems, such that knowledge of the collective variables in one subsystem provides information about the collective variables in other subsystems. The idea that a form of weak objectivity emerges from the proliferation of such records is known as quantum Darwinism [59, [153] [154] [155] [156] [157] [158] .
The predictability sieve consequently maximizes predictability in two distinct ways. Not only does it select reduced states whose behavior is as close to deterministic as possible; it also allows the properties of subsystems to be inferred from information about other subsystems.
This version of the predictability sieve uses the same general entropy-minimization concept proposed in Zurek's original work [32, 58, 150, 151] . It differs, however, in the details of how the entropy is defined. The original sieve dealt with individual pure states of a given subsystem and generated entropy by taking a partial trace over the environment of that subsystem. In contrast, the functional (47) is formulated directly in terms of the entropy generated by the reduction process defined by Eqs. (4) and (43) . It therefore deals with all subsystems together and with the entire set of projectors (8) as a whole.
The main conceptual difference lies in the choice of what is defined to be irrelevant in order to generate entropy. One irrelevant quantity here is the distinction between different states in a manifold M A i . As described in Sec. IV E, this concept of irrelevance cannot always be handled by decomposing subsystems into a tensor product of a collective subsystem and an internal environment. The recipe of tracing over an internal environment is therefore generally incapable of handling the relevance concept associated with collective variables.
Tracing over an environment also does not mean that the environment is treated as irrelevant, at least in the context of Zurek's formulation of the predictability sieve.
For example, if the total system is in a pure state, the entropy of any subsystem is the same as the entropy of its environment [1, 77] , so minimizing the former is the same as minimizing the latter. In any event, treating an external environment as truly irrelevant would be inappropriate even in cosmological contexts, because the state of an entirely unknown environment should for consistency be described as a state of maximum entropy. But this corresponds to an infinite-temperature environment, which conflicts with the experimental evidence showing that our cosmological environment is better described as a heat bath at a temperature of about 2.7 K.
Despite the difference in detail between the definitions of the two sieves, the main qualitative conclusions derived by applying Zurek's original sieve to simple model systems are likely to hold for the modified sieve as well. In particular, note that neither version of the predictability sieve makes any reference to a criterion of macroscopic locality in coordinate space (cf. Sec. VI D). The decoherence of macroscopically nonlocal superpositions is, rather, presumably a contingent dynamical consequence of the predictability sieve for many typical initial states ρ(t a ) and Hamiltonians H and does not need to be imposed as an axiom. No explicit tests of this statement are performed here, however.
B. Constrained variation and dynamical stability
In the above definition of the predictability sieve, the projector set P was assumed not to change during the time interval ∆t. This does not mean that P is independent of time, because the application of the sieve at a succession of different times t a will give a succession of different values of P. What it does mean is that this predictability sieve is applicable only to projector sets that are slowly varying functions of time. That is, it must be possible to choose the interval ∆t between reductions to satisfy Eq. (22) , in which τ P is the timescale for the dynamics of P. But this is just the condition for dynamical stability introduced in Sec. VI F.
The constraint P(t b ) = P(t a ) could presumably be relaxed by allowing P(t b ) to vary independently of P(t a ) and searching for minima of G in the neighborhood of those derived from this constraint. However, the assumption that P(t b ) ≈ P(t a ) could not be eliminated without violating the criterion of dynamical stability.
C. Variation of subsystem decomposition
Note that the projector set P depends on the set of variables S used to define the subsystem decomposition: P = P(S). The variation of P in the search for minima of G therefore generally involves variation of S as well. In this way, the predictability sieve provides a criterion for defining the time dependence of subsystem decompositions, at least in regard to macroscopic subsystems.
The variations of S and P may in general have to be performed separately. For example, in typical quantum measurement situations, an isolated subsystem interacts with a macroscopic measuring apparatus that is initially in a metastable state. During this interaction there is a significant probability of triggering a phase transition, such as the condensation of a liquid droplet in a cloud chamber. For most practical experiments, the description of such amplification processes involving metastable states would require the use of thermodynamic variables such as temperature. This introduces an additional layer of complication into the theory, because the subsystems would then have to be defined at the thermodynamic level, as discussed in Sec. II. That is, thermodynamic concepts would emerge as usual from a conceptual statistical ensemble of quantum states in, say, a quasi-canonical distribution. For the individual members of the ensemble, the subsystem decompositions S would be treated as fixed, and the predictability sieve would be applied only to the projector sets P. Variation of S would be performed in a separate predictability sieve applied to the ensemble as a whole. However, to avoid inessential complications, this thermodynamic type of description is not considered further here.
D. Restriction of freedom to choose subsystems
The predictability sieve imposes a very powerful restriction on the freedom to choose the subsystems S and projector sets P. Choices that violate these restrictions are not logically forbidden, but they are basically useless for any type of practical calculations or meaningful comparison with experiment. As noted by Bohr [106] , a limited degree of freedom remains, due in this case to the presumed existence of multiple (possibly infinitely many) viable solutions of the variation problem. However, this restricted set of choices is, by any reasonable criterion, of measure zero in comparison to the completely arbitrary set that describes the possibilities prior to the solution of the preferred-basis problem. The remaining freedom of choice has no observable consequences as long as the projectors P i and the reduction intervals ∆t are fine-grained enough to be well below the resolution limit of any protoscientists using the theory. In this way, the seemingly arbitrary choice of S and P becomes weakly objective rather than subjective.
E. Choice of microscopic observables
At this point we are in a position to address the question raised at the end of Sec. VII E. Namely, is it not a trivialization of the measurement problem if we only deal with orthogonal sets of projectors at any given instant of time? The questions that troubled the founders were related, rather, to the freedom of the experimenter to choose any observable from a noncommuting set. Indeed, the presumption that the experimenter has the freedom to control the conditions of an experiment is a necessary prerequisite for any pragmatic account of experimental physics [76, 106, [124] [125] [126] .
This freedom has already implicitly been incorporated into the definition of the assembly of isolated subsystems used to perform quantum-state tomography in Sec. IX E. The basic issue is that the choice of observable is determined by the choice of measuring apparatus used to achieve the indirect reduction of the state of the isolated subsystem. However, as shown above, the emergence of outcomes occurs on the timescale ∆t τ P defined in Eq. (22) . But questions about the free will of the experimenter become meaningful only in the opposite limit of time intervals comparable to or greater than τ P , where other levels of emergence come into play.
The future dynamics of planets in the solar system can be predicted with near certainty even for time intervals much greater than τ P . However, the future of individual human beings (and their proxies, such as the pseudo-random switches in the Aspect experiment [159] ) is predictable only for time intervals close to τ P , beyond which the dynamics quickly becomes almost entirely unpredictable. On these longer timescales, one can therefore invoke the free will of the experimenter without fear of contradiction, even though this concept is nowhere to be found among the basic principles of quantum mechanics. It should be stressed that this level of emergence does not require the formulation of any model for the consciousness of the experimenter; it depends only on the assumption that the choices of the experimenter are wholly unpredictable and can thus be treated as "free" variables within the theory [76, 125] .
To put this in concrete terms, if an experimenter has set up a given experiment, has placed her finger on the "start" button, and the nerve impulses to press the button are already racing down her arm, she certainly does not have the freedom to swap this experiment for another. That freedom comes into being only on longer timescales τ fw τ P , when her actions are no longer predictable.
F. Redundancy of records as a primary concept
Riedel has recently suggested that the redundancy of records described in Sec. X A can be used as a criterion for the definition of branches of the quantum state vector [160] . This definition also makes use of the condition of locality in coordinate space discussed in Sec. VI D, together with an explicit length scale defining the spatial extent of nonlocality. It is not yet clear whether this length scale can be eliminated from the definition [160] , but the concept of locality in coordinate space appears to be fundamental to Riedel's method.
It is also unclear whether the redundancy of records can be developed into a practical tool for the construction of branches that has all of the advantages of the predictability sieve. Here the latter has been chosen because it is more fully developed and the redundancy of records can be derived from it without the need for any a priori reference to locality in coordinate space.
One intriguing outcome of Riedel's work is a definition of compatibility of recorded observables that does not require the corresponding operators to commute [160] . It would be interesting to see whether this concept can be developed further in a context free of locality constraints.
XI. EMERGENCE OF WEAK OBJECTIVITY
A. Weak objectivity in quantum mechanics
As noted already in Sec. IV G, the GMH demon is just a useful idealization. All information gathered from experiments is gathered by individual protoscientists; it is therefore unavoidably subjective. The subjective origin of all quantum-mechanical information was acknowledged early on by von Neumann [1] , London and Bauer [140] , and Wigner [161] , and this aspect of the problem is embraced unflinchingly in the modern theory of quantum Bayesianism (or QBism) [162] [163] [164] [165] [166] [167] .
However, to avoid accusations of blatant subjectivity [112] or solipsism [168] , it is helpful to formulate the theory in a way that does not refer directly, at least in the first instance, to the limitations of humans or other individual observers. This is the role of the GMH demon, for whom the relevant histories belong to a set roughly comparable to what Gell-Mann and Hartle have called a "maximal" [54, 83] or "full" [80, 169] set, thereby defining a so-called quasiclassical realm [170, 171] . The word "maximal" suggests that this set should be as finegrained as possible, consistent with the limitations of decoherence and predictability in Eq. (22) . It is unlikely that exact solutions can be found for this variation problem, but for practical purposes all that is needed is a set of histories that is much more fine-grained than the resolution limits of any protoscientist using the theory. The histories relevant to these protoscientists can then be taken to be coarse-grainings of the quasi-maximal set defined for the GMH demon. Weak objectivity emerges in the limit in which the fine-grained features of the demon's quasiclassical realm become indiscernible to all protoscientists using the theory.
Of course, from this point of view, there is no guarantee that the quasiclassical realm corresponding to our everyday experiences is unique [170, 172] . However, since the existence of multiple inequivalent quasiclassical realms would not affect the conclusion of weak objectivity, this topic is not pursued further here.
B. Strong objectivity?
Many authors have tried to reformulate quantum mechanics as a strongly objective theory. The temptation to reach for this prize is obvious, but it comes at a price: one must forfeit any possible claims of weak objectivity, as these are derived from emergence. If the attempt at strong objectivity fails, the theory that remains is merely subjective.
In this genre, the class of theories known as dynamicalreduction models [47, 48] is particularly well developed. In the version known as continuous spontaneous localization, reduction is generated by coarse-grained number operators rather than projection operators. The most important difference from the present theory, however, is that the reduction process is tethered to a fixed choice of preferred basis-namely, a coarse-grained coordinate basis. The parameters of the model seem to be tailored to mimic the emergence, in many common cases of decoherence, of such a basis as the preferred basis [30] . But in decoherence theory, the preferred basis is always contingent upon the form of the Hamiltonian and the initial state ρ. As noted by Gell-Mann and Hartle [54] , "there are no variables that are expected to decohere universally."
This leads to a well-known difficulty, in that decoherence can occur by mechanisms that do not generate a macroscopic displacement of particles in coordinate space and thus do not immediately trigger a reduction in the dynamical-reduction model [173] . In responding to this criticism, Ghirardi et al. have argued that ultimately, the detection of any measurement outcome in the eyes and nervous system of a human observer would definitely trigger such a reduction [47, 174, 175] . They have also pointed out that such a process does not imply any role for the consciousness of a sentient observer.
Nevertheless, the mere presence of such discrepancies shows that a coarse-grained coordinate basis cannot serve as the foundation for a weakly objective theory. They also raise the suspicion that such a basis would be an inadequate foundation for a strongly objective theory too. Ultimately the latter question can only be decided by experiment. Dynamical-reduction models have recently been subjected to increasingly stringent empirical tests, which so far have not yielded any qualitative conclusions [48, [176] [177] [178] [179] [180] [181] [182] .
The fundamental issue of concern here is closely related to the questions about the concept of macroscopically local observables discussed in Secs. VI D and VI E. However, there the criterion of macroscopic locality was used only in the formulation of the pseudometric (17), rather than being inserted directly into the definition of a preferred basis.
Similar comments can be made about pilot-wave theories [44] [45] [46] . Here the ontology is based on particle trajectories, even though the concept of a particle is known to be emergent [183, 184] and individual trajectories cannot be measured [185, 186] , at least in the standard version of the theory where particle probabilities are assumed to follow the Born rule exactly [187] . Within this version of the theory, there are infinitely many inequivalent ways of defining the trajectories, all of which yield the same experimental predictions [188] . All empirical predictions are derived from the wave function itself and its decomposition into subsystems [189] ; the role of the particle trajectories is simply to delineate a sequence of effective reductions in the coordinate representation. At this level, the particle trajectories are a purely subjective addition to the formalism of orthodox quantum mechanics.
The only possible foundation for a claim of strong objectivity therefore lies in the "quantum non-equilibrium" version of the theory in which the particle trajectories do not satisfy the Born rule exactly [187] . Again, claims of this sort can only be adjudicated experimentally. However, given that both the concept of a particle and the special status of the coordinate representation emerge from standard quantum mechanics, it is difficult to accept such a proposal of strong objectivity in the absence of compelling evidence.
XII. EMERGENT REALITY
The theory developed here shows that the reduction process can be regarded as emerging from unitary dynamics under certain well-defined conditions. However, this situation is unusual in science because the base-level theory (i.e., the Schrödinger equation for a closed system) is not experimentally accessible [105, 190, 191] . Only the overall theory comprising both reduction and unitary dynamics can be tested in the laboratory. What does it even mean to talk of "emergence" in this case?
It is also common to think of the base level as being more "real" than the emergent level. The latter is sometimes called an "illusion." However, the word "real" is also usually restricted to what is empirically testable. How are we to deal with this situation?
The word "reality" has many different meanings. In one sense it refers to something assumed to exist "out there," independent of any observer. But since we have no access to any such "thing in itself," this concept is not very useful on its own. It is more useful to talk about reality as an idea that we use to order and make sense of our experience [192] . That is, we apply the concept of reality to theories rather than things.
One such idea is that of an absolute or totalitarian reality R, which is a Boolean variable. A value R ∈ {0, 1} can always be assigned to any given theory. However, this assignment must then be tested by comparing it with the empirical or pragmatic reality r, which is a real variable in the range 0 < r < 1 (not 0 ≤ r ≤ 1). It may be defined as
in which x is some set of variables, ∆x is the discrepancy between theory and experiment, and δx is a typical range of x in some domain of experience D. If η 1, we can say that the theory is real in the pragmatic sense within this given domain. But such a result can never strictly justify an assignment of R = 1 in the absolute sense.
A major difficulty with the concept of absolute reality is that any assignment of R = 1 immediately becomes invalid whenever the theory is found to emerge from another level. But this means that R is a chimera, because (as noted in the Introduction) there are no empirically validated theories (i.e., theories with η 1 in some domain) that are not already known to be emergent. The only "laws" of physics thus far discovered are approximate ways of describing some part of our experience, not clockwork mechanisms that control the universe.
Hence, all we have left is the domain-dependent concept of pragmatic reality. This has the advantage that the concept of reality now becomes meaningful in many different domains; we no longer have to assume that everything we see is an illusion. But we also no longer have the right to assign an absolute reality to anything.
In this sense it is not meaningful to talk about the reality of the unitarily evolving quantum state, prior to any concept of reduction. Pragmatic reality deals only with the experimentally accessible combination of unitary evolution and reduction. But the Schrödinger equation still plays an indispensable role in this combination. As Feynman has observed [193] , "it is not true that we can pursue science completely by using only those concepts which are directly subject to experiment." It is hard to imagine how a useful theory of open-system dynamics could be formulated without making use at some point of assumptions about the environment of the open system, developed in the context of a larger system evolving according to the Schrödinger equation. And it is well known that reducing the state prematurely will give results in conflict with experiment [121] .
In recognition of this role, the unreduced quantum state is sometimes said to represent a kind of "veiled reality" [14] . Weinberg expressed this idea clearly [194] when he said that "wave functions are real for the same reason that quarks and symmetries are-because it is useful to include them in our theories."
The quark is an apt analogy because the theory of quantum chromodynamics itself predicts that free quarks can never be observed experimentally. Yet the concept of a quark is now accepted as a part of reality because it is so useful as an organizing principle for experiments in high-energy physics-in particular, those performed in the domain of asymptotic freedom.
Likewise, Everett himself showed no compunction in acknowledging that [105] "it is impossible for any observer to discover the total state function of any physical system." Yet the total state of a closed system, independent of any reduction, is useful enough to be recognized as a part of reality, particularly in light of quantum-state tomography experiments used to measure (in the statistical sense) the states of isolated subsystems-a type of asymptotic freedom, as it were. Of course, emergent subsystems and the reduction process are parts of this reality, too.
In a similar manner, it is meaningful to talk about the emergence of reduction from unitary evolution simply because this concept is useful. Formulating the measurement problem in terms of emergence is beneficial because it places both the objective and subjective aspects of quantum mechanics front and center and forces us to reconcile them. If nothing else, this approach may help to short-circuit the heated debates over philosophical issues that tend to be generated when objectivity is viewed as a binary concept, with nothing between the two poles of strong objectivity and pure subjectivity.
XIII. CONCLUSIONS
Many authors have argued that the key to the measurement problem lies in the macroscopic nature of the measuring apparatus and the corresponding inability of an observer to distinguish among the many microstates consistent with a given macrostate of the apparatus [91, 112, [195] [196] [197] . However, it has long been known that this argument provides at best some partial support for a statistical interpretation of the state vector; it does not justify the claim that either the state vector or the density operator is consistent with the appearance of definite experimental outcomes [2, 11, 13, 16, 17] .
Here I have shown that the problem of outcomes can be resolved, at least in the sense of emergence, if the assertion of an observer's inability to distinguish among these microstates is followed through and applied consistently in all parts of the theory. Consistency demands that the quantum state be defined not as a vector, ray, or density operator in Hilbert space but as an equivalence class of density operators [36] [37] [38] . For integrated subsystems, such an equivalence class can be represented mathematically by a projection operator [36] , but if isolated subsystems are involved, the class representative must also include the associated conditional states. This definition must be applied every time the quantum state is reduced, on a timescale slow in comparison to the decoherence time but fast in comparison to the relevant quasiclassical dynamics. The ubiquitous Lüders reduction formula [60] retains too much information. Trying to justify the appearance of distinct outcomes using this formula is like trying to justify the second law of thermodynamics without repeatedly discarding the irrelevant information generated during the mixing process; it simply cannot be done.
The use of equivalence classes in the quantum theory of measurement has been advocated by such luminaries as von Neumann [36] and Jauch [37, 38] . To the extent that their proposals are remembered today, they seem to be regarded mainly as failed rivals to the throne currently occupied by decoherence theory. However, as Zurek has pointed out [158] , a likely reason for the slow progress in almost a century of work on the measurement problem is that its solution requires many ideas, not just one. Here the definition of quantum states as equivalence classes is indeed only one piece of the puzzle. Its utility is maximized by working in harmony with the other concepts of decoherence theory, rather than as a competitor.
One of the most important of these concepts is that of dynamical stability. This can be used to define a metric in which the distance between states before and after reduction becomes arbitrarily small in the limit of slowly varying projector sets, without referring to any criterion of locality in coordinate space. This provides additional support for the introduction of equivalence classes in which these states are defined to be identical.
The concept of dynamical stability also appears in the form of the predictability sieve used to solve the preferred-basis problem. Here the predictability sieve has been adapted to ensure its consistency with the modified reduction process, but Zurek's basic principle of entropy minimization [150] remains the same. On the other hand, entropy is also maximized, following Jaynes [114] , with respect to the states within a given manifold defined by the collective variables. The basic idea is to minimize the entropy of whatever we can, in principle, obtain information about (i.e., the collective variables of integrated subsystems) and maximize the entropy of everything else. This entropy maximization is at first glance just a natural outcome of the definition of equivalence-class representatives. However, at a deeper level it is seen to be a fundamental postulate of dynamics, on par with the Schrödinger equation itself.
Another essential concept is that isolated subsystems are reduced only indirectly, via their interaction with the directly reduced states of integrated subsystems. The basis for this approach in standard quantum mechanics is described clearly by Landau and Lifshitz [137] . In the context of the present theory of equivalence classes, this indirect reduction of isolated subsystems leads to the conditional states now widely used in the definition of quantum discord [39] [40] [41] [42] . The distinct roles played by isolated and integrated subsystems in this theory are reminiscent of Bohr's insistence on the "necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement between those parts of the physical system considered which are to be treated as measuring instruments and those which constitute the objects under investigation" [106] . Bohr's argument, like the one given here, concerns the way in which information is extracted from these subsystems.
In the resulting theory, the pristine beauty of the Schrödinger equation is "continually abrogated by dicemiracles" [198] . Nevertheless, the existence of an emergent limit ensures that the abrogation is smooth enough to be unnoticeable on some measures, thereby allowing a peaceful coexistence between the objective features described by unitary dynamics and the subjective features described by the reduction process. Because the simultaneous presence of these objective and subjective features is mandated not just by quantum mechanics but by the scientific method itself, it is unlikely that we can ever "unscramble Bohr's omelette" [199] in the sense of isolating the objective features in an empirically validated theory. Hence, we are stuck with a weakly objective theory that is good only for all practical purposes [13] . But that is good enough.
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Appendix A: Fidelity and trace distance for Lüders reduction of pure states
The trace distance (16) is bounded by the inequalities [115] 
in which the fidelity is defined as [77, 89] F (ρ, σ) ≡ tr ρ 1/2 σρ 1/2 2 = F (σ, ρ).
If ρ is a pure state, this takes the simple form [77] F (ρ, σ) = tr ρσ,
and the bounds (A1) can be tightened to [77] 1 − F (ρ, σ) ≤ D(ρ, σ) ≤ 1 − F (ρ, σ).
This is obtained by substituting P = ρ into the inequality tr[P (ρ − σ)] ≤ D(ρ, σ) [cf. Eqs. (17) and (19) ]. The example discussed in Sec. VI A is the case of a Lüders reduction for a pure state ρ. The relevant fidelities are then
in which all quantities are evaluated at some given reduction time t = t j . Clearly, neither of the corresponding trace distances D is small for the general case in which more than one value of w i is significant. If, however, the outcome i = 1 is dominant, it is convenient to write w 1 = 1− , where 1. For arbitrary we have i =1 w i = , 0 ≤ w i =1 ≤ , and 0 ≤ i =1 w 
The relevant bounds (A4) on the trace distance are 
for some given sets of operators {R 
which was to be proved.
Appendix C: Increase of entropy upon partial reductions
The equivalence class (42) and reduced state (43) for the partial reduction discussed in Sec. IX B share many of the properties of the equivalence class (24) and reduced state (26) for the total reduction discussed in Sec. VII B. The most important of these properties are the identities shown in Eqs. (25) , (27) , and (28) .
The derivation of Eq. (25) is a simple exercise that follows immediately from the orthogonality relations (3). The derivation of Eq. (27) was given already in Appendix B. The only remaining case is therefore Eq. (28) .
As noted in Sec. VII B, Eq. (28) is a consequence of Eqs. (27) and (30) . The proof of Eq. (30) in the case of a partial reduction follows that given by von Neumann [36] for a total reduction. To set the stage, let us start by considering the transformation ρ = P A ρP A , (C1) in which P A is a projector that acts nontrivially only on the subsystems in set A:
The density operator ρ can be expanded as
in which A i and B j are operators that act in A and B, respectively. Thus
The projectorP A can be expanded as
in which {|e µ } is some orthonormal basis of eigenvectors ofP A . Equation (C4) then becomes
For the special case of a rank-one projector (i.e., d = 1), we have M 11 = P A and thus
This result can now be used to evaluate the successive transformations in which {P Aα } and {Q Aβ } are sets of rank-one projectors. Following von Neumann [36] , we can choose these projectors to form complementary sets in each subspace defined by the projectors P i . The derivation given by von Neumann [36] then shows immediately that ρ is the same as the reduced stateρ defined in Eq. (43) . But Eqs.
(C9) and (C10) are Lüders reductions, which cannot decrease the entropy S(ρ) [77] . Hence, the nondecreasingentropy property (30) has been established, from which the maximum-entropy property (28) follows.
